ARTILLERY AND TERRAIN IN THE AMERICAN CIVIL WAR:
THE BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE, OCTOBER 8, 1862

Judy Ehlen
U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center
Topographic Engineering Center
Alexandria, VA 22315-3864
Tel: (703) 428-6887
Email: jehlen@tec.army.mil

Robert J. Abrahart
School of Geography
University of Nottingham
University Park
Nottingham NG7 2RD
United Kingdom
Tel: +44 (0)115 84 66145
Email: bob.abrahart@nottingham.ac.uk

and

William Andrews
Kentucky Geological Survey
228 Mining and Mineral Resources Building
University of Kentucky
Lexington, KY 40506-0107
Tel: 859-257-5500 ext 138
Email: wandrews@kgs.mm.uky.edu

ABSTRACT

Rapidly improving industrial and manufacturing technologies in the early to mid-19th century forced major changes in military tactics and weapons. Even with modern weapons, and the changes in tactics that such weapons required, the ground over which a battle was fought maintained its status as one of the most important factors in either gaining victory or suffering defeat: Even modern weapons could not overcome difficult terrain! This paper illustrates some of the effects of terrain on the use of field artillery in the Battle of Perryville, October 8, 1862. This battle, fought in the Bluegrass region of central Kentucky, is perhaps the best example of its time upon which to perform an evaluation of the effects of terrain on field artillery because most of the fighting was a duel between artillery batteries and for artillery positions. The Confederate invasion of Kentucky by General Braxton Bragg's Army of the Mississippi, and the circumstances that preceded this invasion, are outlined as an introduction to the battle. The main section of this paper comprises an account of the Battle of Perryville, which was fought against Union Major General Don Carlos Buell's Army of the Ohio, presented from the perspective of the artillery batteries of the two opposing armies. This appraisal highlights the effects of terrain on the use of artillery. Specific examples are provided to illustrate the manner in which local terrain and geology affected the deployment and operation of artillery batteries on the battlefield. The visual characteristics of the terrain and its influence on the combatants are illustrated with captured screen-grabs of a virtual world, constructed from a 10-meter resolution digital elevation model, that includes markers to indicate the changing positions of, and fields of fire for, the various batteries over time. The use of virtual viewpoints and distance fog permits a realistic appreciation and understanding of the battlefield situation, in terms of what can be seen and the degree to which such items present a visible threat, to provide a more realistic rendering and location-based appraisal than is otherwise possible with traditional flat-map viewshed operations.

INTRODUCTION

". . . such a storm of shell, grape, canister and Minie balls was turned loose upon us as no troops scarcely ever before encountered." (Lieutenant Colonel William Frierson, 27th Tennessee, O.R., 1886, 1118)

The Battle of Perryville occurred on October 8, 1862, in the Bluegrass region of Kentucky. This was a battle between artillery pieces and for artillery positions, in large part due to the terrain over which the battle was fought, and exemplifies the extent to which terrain affected the use of field artillery in the American Civil War. The campaign itself is described in a number of sources, including Connelly (1967), Hafendorfer (1991) and McDonough (1994). Noe (2001) also provides an excellent and highly-detailed account of the battle itself. For information on field artillery in the Civil War, see Ripley (1970), Hazlett, et al. (1988) or Katcher (2001). This paper will concentrate on the effects of terrain on the use of field artillery during the Confederate attack on Union General McCook's First Corps in the central and northern parts of the battlefield (Perryville Battlefield State Historic Site).

The battle was fought between General Braxton Bragg's Confederate Army of the Mississippi and Major General Don Carlos Buell's Union Army of the Ohio. The two armies first met in April, 1862, at the Battle of Shiloh. After Shiloh, Buell moved east through central Tennessee. Bragg followed and flanked Buell, in order to reach Chattanooga, to support the forces of Confederate General Kirby Smith which were thought to be endangered by Buell's advance. The two Confederate armies agreed to cooperate on a flanking move into central Kentucky in August. Bragg entered Kentucky before Buell, but shortly afterwards, lost contact with the Union army. The two opposing armies - Bragg's without Kirby Smith's component - met on October 7, in the rolling hills just west of the small town of Perryville (Figure 1). Battle commenced the following morning.

Figure 1: Map showing Kentucky, the surrounding states, and Perryville.

The Confederate Army of the Mississippi, commanded by General Bragg, consisted of two wings, one commanded by Major General Leonidas Polk, and the other, by Major General William J. Hardee. It had a total of 56 guns, less than 20% of which were rifles (Noe, 2001). The right wing had four batteries; the left wing had nine. The Union Army of the Ohio commanded by General Buell consisted of three corps: First Corps commanded by Major General Alexander McD. McCook, Second Corps commanded by Major General Thomas L. Crittenden, and Third Corps commanded by Brigadier General (Acting Major General) Charles C. Gilbert. The Army of the Ohio had a total of 147 guns, of which approximately 62 (more than 42%) were rifles (Noe, 2001). First Corps had six batteries; Second Corps had eleven; and Third Corps had nine. Nineteen of the 26 batteries had at least one rifle (Noe, 2001). The weapons and batteries involved in the battle are listed in Table 1; an abbreviated order of battle is provided in Appendix 1. Both Table 1 and Appendix 1 are restricted to the units that had artillery batteries that were active in the attack that is described in this paper.

PERRYVILLE

In 1862, Perryville was a small market town with a population of about 500 (McDonough, 1994). The town, which was the center of a rich agricultural region, is set astride the Chaplin River, in Boyle County, Kentucky. Under normal conditions, this is a well-watered area, that contains numerous creeks in addition to the Chaplin River. However, at the time of the battle, this area was suffering from a severe drought. The town was also a road hub as described by Confederate General Hardee in his report of the battle written in December 1862:

A good road running a little south of east from Mackvillle to Perryville crosses this stream and a turnpike from Springfield running nearly east and west passes through Perryville to Danville. Another fine macadamized highway traverses the village from the south in a northwardly direction toward Harrodsburg and Lexington and another southwardly in the direction of Lebanon. (O.R., 1886, 1120)

He also described the local terrain and commented on its favorable military aspects:

The country near Perryville is boldly undulating and varied with farm-houses, corn fields, and plantations, bordered by native forests. A creek called Chaplin Fork flows northwardly though the village and unites 4 or 5 miles beyond with another little stream called Doctor's Fork. The space between the two from east to west is about 1½ miles. . . . The position at Perryville is strong, and offered many tactical and strategical advantages. (O.R., 1886, 1120)

Union General McCook was of a similar opinion, and stated in his report of the battle written on October 18:

The battle-field was a chosen one for the enemy. . . . The ground upon which the battle was fought was very much broken by hills and deep ravines, which afforded every facility to them for concealing their troops. . . . The bluffs and dry channels of Chaplin River and Doctor's Fork afforded them every advantage for concealing and massing large bodies of troops. (O.R., 1886, 1042)

The details of the terrain are the result of local geology. The Bluegrass region is classic limestone terrain - green, gently rolling hills - in which springs, sinkholes, swallow holes, caves, and dry valleys abound. The area around Perryville is a dissected plateau, with a maximum elevation of about 950 feet, and maximum local relief of about 150 feet. The ridges are capped by the Middle Ordovician Clays Ferry Formation, which consists of interbedded limestones, shales, and siltstones (Cressman, 1974). On the higher ridges, the Clays Ferry produces a very slightly undulating terrain, in which the shales and siltstones form low humps, and the limestone forms the shallow depressions that occur between them. The Lexington Limestone, a purer limestone, lies below the Clays Ferry (Cressman, 1974) and forms the lower slopes of the ridges and the valleys. The topography in the Lexington is rolling, but many of the hills have steep slopes. The beds in both formations are near horizontal, albeit with a very slight dip to the southeast. The main features of this terrain are the result of solution along joints and differential weathering. The streams and valleys in the battlefield area follow a rectilinear dendritic pattern. A shallow network of karst features has developed in the soluble limestones of the Lexington, producing a series of sinkholes in the valley bottoms. The karst springs provided a water supply to this area, during periods of an otherwise severe drought, which is the major factor that attracted the two armies to this specific location.

THE BATTLE OF PERRYVILLE, OCTOBER 8, 1862

The first action in the Battle of Perryville took place very early in the morning of October 8, 1-2 km to the west of Perryville, between Confederate General St. John Liddell's brigade and parts of Union General Phillip Sheridan's Division (Appendix 1) with Peters Hill and Bottom Hill as the two focal points (Figure 2). It ended long before the major action began. Indeed, following initial deployments, it was not until after noon that the main battle commenced with an artillery barrage about 1230. About 1400 the main part of the battle began north-northwest of Perryville near Walker's Bend on the Chaplin River (the current site of Perryville Battlefield State Historic Site; Figure 2). This part of the battle involved the Confederate brigades of Daniel Donelson, George Maney and Alexander Stewart, from General Benjamin Franklin Cheatham's Division (Polk's Wing; Appendix 1); and the Union brigades of John Starkweather, William Terrill and George Webster, from General Lovell H. Rousseau's Division (McCook's Corps; Appendix 1). In broad terms: The Confederate forces were in the east, in areas of lower elevation; and the Union forces were in the west, in areas of higher elevation. Fighting in this sector stopped at sunset, about 1630.

Figure 2: The area in which the Battle of Perryville was fought.

Shortly after fighting began near Walker's Bend, about 1430, action also began in the vicinity of the Bottom House along Doctor's Creek northwest of Perryville (Figure 2). This part of the battle, which occurred across the valleys of Doctor's Creek and Bull Run, involved the Confederate brigades of Thomas Jones, John Brown, and Daniel Adams from General J. Patton Anderson's Division, and Patrick Cleburne's and Bushrod Johnson's brigades from General Simon Bolivar Buckner's Division (both divisions being part of Hardee's Wing), and the Union brigades of Leonard Harris and William Lytle from Rousseau's Division. The artillery batteries occupied high ground on both sides of the battlefield. Fighting in this area continued until after darkness fell.

Arrival, Deployment, and Barrage

Returning from a visit to Kirby Smith, who was camped near Lexington, General Bragg reached Perryville about 0930 October 8 and took command from Polk (Noe, 2001). Both wings of the Confederate army were positioned west of Perryville, looking across the valley of Doctor's Creek and Bull Run. Bragg saw parts of Union General Rousseau's Division, situated northwest of Perryville, moving toward Walker's Bend on the Chaplin River. He also observed that the Confederate right was not anchored, and thus ordered Hardee to move some of his forces in that direction, to face Rousseau across Doctor's Creek. Hardee's men began moving into position, to the right of their original position, about 1100 (Noe, 2001).

The initial Confederate artillery dispositions were as follows (Figure 3A). Captain Henry Semple's battery was positioned in the first instance on Seminary Hill, at the northeastern edge of Perryville, to cover the Springfield Pike and thus Hardee's left (O.R., 1886; Noe, 2001). However, for the battle proper, Semple's battery was repositioned to Chatham Hill - to northeast of Captain Putnam Darden's battery - which was also situated on of Chatham Hill overlooking Doctor's Creek (Figure 3A; Noe, 2001). Noe (2001) indicates that Captain Charles Swett's battery (Appendix I) may also have unlimbered at this spot. Captain William Carnes' battery was placed still further to the northeast, but looking to the southwest, in response to Union General Rousseau's positioning of Captain Cyrus Loomis' battery across the valley (see below; Noe, 2001). All four batteries were well placed on high ground such that their fields of fire overlapped (Figure 3B).

Figure 3: A. Digital elevation model showing the batteries involved in the opening barrage.

Figure 3: B. Confederate fields of fire: Viewshed analysis for the batteries of Semple and Darden. Mapped values indicate the number of batteries from which each location could be seen.

The initial elements of First Corps, parts of Union General Rousseau's Division, reached the battlefield shortly after 1000 (Noe, 2001), and Second Corps, not till around 1100 (Noe, 2001). General McCook began lining up Rousseau's Division on high ground, west of Doctor's Creek, and north of where Bull Run enters the creek, to the left and north of Gilbert's Corps which had arrived on October 7 (Figure 2).

Union artillery deployments were as follows. McCook first ordered Rousseau to place Loomis' battery near, and to the left of, the Russell House (Figure 2), but then discovered that Rousseau had advanced the line about 800 yards to the east (O.R., 1886). Rousseau had deployed two of Loomis' Parrotts (Table 1) on his far right at the request of cavalry Captain Ebenezer Gay to support Captain William Hotchkiss' battery on Peters Hill to the south (O.R., 1886; Noe, 2001). When Rousseau saw that the Confederates were withdrawing from Bottom Hill on his right, he moved Loomis' battery further east onto an exposed spur that commanded the valleys of Doctor's Creek and Bull Run (Figure 3A; Noe, 2001). The three Confederate batteries across the creek soon opened fire on Loomis, and Rousseau ordered the rest of Loomis' battery to the front and also ordered Captain Peter Simonson's battery, consisting of two six-pounders (Figure 4), two 12-pounders, and two 3.8 inch rifles, to join him on Loomis' left (O.R., 1886). Simonson's battery had initially been placed near the Russell House (O.R., 1886). The three Confederate batteries were most likely Carnes, Semple and Darden, but it is possible that Swett's battery was also engaged (see above). Simonson, who occupied this position about 1300, describes these batteries as " . . . one directly in front, say 1,600 yards; another, a little to our right, about the same, and another still farther to the right, about 1,000 yards." (O.R., 1886, 1055) Captain Samuel Harris' battery remained on the high ridge occupied by the Russell House, in front of, and well to the left of, the Mackville Road on Simonson's left, where it was initially deployed (Figure 3A; O.R., 1886; Noe, 2001). In these positions, Loomis, Simonson, and Harris could sweep the full range of hills on their front from south to northwest with overlapping fire (Figure 3B).

Figure 4: Bronze six pounder. This gun was part of Union Captain Peter Simonson's 5th Battery, Indiana Light Artillery (Perryville Battlefield State Historic Site, Perryville, KY).

About 1230, the three Union batteries - Loomis, Simonson, and Hotchkiss - and the three (or four) Confederate batteries - Carnes, Semple, Darden, and possibly Swett - began a fierce barrage (O.R., 1886). At first, the Union guns had difficulty finding the correct range: Noe (2001) states that Loomis' shell has been found 600 yards behind Carnes' position. In addition, Hotchkiss, with his two 12-pounders, was unable to reach Carnes from his position on Peters Hill (Hotchkiss' position is not shown on Figure 3; it is off the area of the image). Simonson's James rifles soon found the effective range, however, as Carnes' fire was joined by that of Captain Charles Lumsden and Lieutenant Thomas Key's section of Calvert's battery (Appendix 1). Darden, to the south, was involved, as well (O.R. 1886). Lumsden's fire against Simonson's battery was initially affected by the illusive nature of the terrain: From his position, Simonson's battery appeared to be located on the crest of the next ridge, and canister from his 12-pounders has been identified in that position. However, Simonson's battery was in fact positioned on the next ridge over, but this was not apparent from Lumsden's position (Figure 5). Carnes' six-pounders were soon replaced about 1300 by Captain T.J. Stanford's three-inch rifles (Noe, 2001). After about an hour, the intense artillery fire began to slacken and calm ensued. Loomis had run out of long-range ammunition and was forced to retire to the vicinity of the Russell House about 1400 (O.R., 1886; Noe, 2001).

Figure 5: View in the virtual world from Lumsden's battery to Simonson's battery. Blue flagpoles mark Union positions; red flagpoles mark Confederate positions. A. The terrain as viewed from the position of Lumsden's battery - note that Simonson's battery (center) appears to be on the top of the next ridge over. B. View in the virtual world from Lumsden's battery to Simonson's battery. Blue flagpoles mark Union positions; red flagpoles mark Confederate positions. In this elevated view from the same point, the presence of a valley can just be discerned showing that Simonson's battery was in fact positioned on the second, not the first ridge.

While the barrage was occurring, Captain David Stone's battery was moved northeast, from near Harris' position (O.R., 1886), extending the Union line to the left. A small knoll further to the northeast, in front of Stone's position, that had been identified as another good artillery position, was occupied about 1500 (O.R., 1886) - this knoll, often called the Open Knob, commanded Walker's Bend on the Chaplin River (Figure 2). Lieutenant Charles Parsons' improvised battery was soon placed there (O.R., 1886; Noe, 2001). This position was about 300 yards in front of the main Union line (O.R, 1886). All Union batteries were now in position, and with the guns of Bush, Stone and Parsons added, the Union artillery commanded the northern part of the battlefield. No Confederate batteries were located in this part of the battlefield at that time.

Meanwhile, reconnaissance by Confederate cavalry commanded by Colonel John Wharton indicated that the Union line extended further to the left than had been thought, and Cheatham's Division was sent to the Confederate right. Unfortunately, due to an optical illusion caused by the terrain, Wharton did not see how far to the east Union forces were in fact deploying (Figure 6), so Cheatham's men, when in position, faced the center of the Union line, rather than its left flank. From Wharton's position, the hill upon which Stone's battery was located masked the ridge behind, upon which Harris was located (Figure 6A). Although Harris' position was in fact slightly higher than Stone's, Wharton was looking very slightly upslope in this rolling limestone terrain. Because Wharton did not know Starkweather's brigade had arrived on the battlefield and or that he was rapidly moving his infantry regiments and artillery into position on the far left of the Union line, he thought the battery he saw was Harris', and thus failed to report that the Union line was being further strengthened to its left and north by Starkweather (Noe, 2001).

Figure 6: View in the virtual world showing what Wharton was able to see of Union deployments from Walkers Bend. Blue flagpoles mark Union positions; red flagpoles mark Confederate positions. A. Forward view from lower hilltop position on Walkers Bend. Harris is more or less out of sight - positioned beneth the tip of his flagpole (third pointer to left of center). B. Elevated view from higher but more distant hilltop position on Walkers Bend. This point overlooks the lower hilltop position (small hummock to left of center) and shows Parsons' (center pointer) and Stone's plus Bush's batteries (left-of-center pointer) - but not Harris' - which no longer appears in our model.

Walker's Bend

With the artillery barrage to the south finished, and while Bush, Stone, and Parsons were taking their positions, Confederate General Donelson attacked what he thought was the Union left at about 1400. Polk's plan was to roll up that flank and push it south, back onto the main Union position (Connelly, 1967; Noe, 2001). However, because Wharton had been unable to see the arrival of Starkweather's brigade on the battlefield and the deployment of Stone's and Bush's batteries (O.R., 1886), Donelson in fact attacked the center of a very strong Union position, and was soon pushed back. The 16th Tennessee, commanded by Colonel John Savage, led the advance across open ground, and sought protection in a hollow part way down the slope (Noe, 2001). Once in the hollow, however, Union artillery batteries opened fire enfilading the hollow (Figure 7). In front was Harris' battery raining case shot, explosive shells, and canister down on Savage's men (Noe, 2001). Parson's battery fired from the Open Knob on the right enfilading Savage's position (McDonough, 1994; Noe, 2001). And Simonson's battery joined the fray from Savage's left firing canister. (Noe, 2001). At some point during this affray, the batteries of Stone and Bush were moved forward, and these batteries turned their guns on the hapless Donelson as well (Noe, 2001). Donelson was without artillery support, because his battery, Carnes', had been taken from him and left behind the lines, so he was forced to fall back.

Figure 7: A. Digital elevation model showing the batteries involved in the northern sector of the battlefield.

Figure 7: B. Union fields of fire: Viewshed analysis of Harris, Stone, Bush and Parsons. Mapped values indicate the number of batteries from which each location could be seen. These guns were well placed to fire at other guns; but needed to be repositioned to repel the combined attack of Donelson, Maney, and Stewart.

Shortly after Donelson's attack failed, and as a result of the realization that the Union line extended significantly further than expected on the Confederate right, Maney's brigade attacked toward Parsons' position on the Open Knob. Maney's sudden appearance about 90 yards away - sudden because the low, rolling hills had masked his advance - took some of the pressure off Donelson (O.R., 1886). Parsons had gotten off only a few shots toward Donelson's failed attack when he was forced to turn his guns and face this new enemy with canister (O.R., 1886; McDonough, 1994). About 1500 Maney received some artillery support from Smith's battery, commanded by Lieutenant William Turner, who took position about 250-300 yards northeast of the Open Knob at a slightly lower elevation (Figure 8; O.R., 1886). Although using inferior weapons - Turner was equipped with only two six-pounders against Parsons' seven 12-pounders and one Parrott - he was able to enfilade Parsons' position from the right with canister (Table 1; O.R., 1886). By about 1530, Maney's Shiloh veterans broke the initial, disorganized Union line and seven of Parsons' eight guns were captured (O.R., 1886). Turner fired on the retreating troops with shell and spherical case (O.R., 1886), and captured five 12-pounders, one 12-pounder howitzer and one Parrott rifle, leaving two of his own six-pounders in exchange (O.R., 1886). He then placed his battery on the Open Knob (Noe, 2001).

Figure 8: View in the virtual world showing the surprise attack on Bush's and Stone's batteries by the Confederate 1st Tennessee regiment: A: View from the perspective of the 1st Tennessee. B: View from defending positions in which foreground obscures the valley up which the 1st Tennessee is advancing.

Just as Donelson's brigade was forced back, Stewart's brigade moved up into line, filling the gap between Donelson and Maney. Stewart's and Donelson's men advanced together uphill though the rolling terrain in the direction of Harris' battery. The Union line held firm, but it was weakening under the combined onslaught of Donelson, Stewart, and Maney. As the Confederate brigades approached, Stone and Bush, supporting Harris' battery, enfiladed the Confederate right flank (Figure 7; O.R., 1886). Stone's and Bush's batteries were finally forced back by the 1st Tennessee. This regiment flanked the batteries and approached unseen from a very steep-sided valley on the left of the two batteries (Figure 8A). The gunners did not see the 1st Tennessee until they crested the slope, only tens of yards away (Figure 8B; Hafendorfer, 1991; O.R., 1886). Bush, firing canister, was unable to depress the barrels of his guns sufficiently to repulse the 1st Tennessee. Stone, also firing canister, was facing three to five other Tennessee regiments (Noe, 2001), that forced him back. About this time, with the help of Wharton, the forgotten Carnes found a commanding position to the northwest from which he could enfilade the Union left flank (Figure 7; O. R., 1886; Noe, 2001). Stone's guns were finally abandoned, and the Union lines stabilized, about 300 yards behind the original position (Noe, 2001). From their new position in the rear, Bush's battery, as well as those of Loomis and possibly Simonson (now in the vicinity of the Russell House), were turned on Carnes who moved forward to a better position, but one closer to the Union lines (Noe, 2001). Turner, in his position on the Open Knob, also felt the effects of Bush's murderous rifle fire and canister. Rousseau sums up the situation in this part of the battle nicely: ". . . the artillery repulsed the enemy again and again, and held him in check for several hours, until finally an overwhelming force moved straight toward the guns." (O.R., 1886, 1046) This part of the Battle of Perryville was over just about sunset shortly after 1630.

The Bottom House

As noted above, Loomis ran out of long-range ammunition during the barrage and was forced to retire to the vicinity of the Russell House, leaving Simsonson's battery alone on the ridge above Doctor's Creek. Simonson (O.R., 1886) notes that Captain Cuthbert Slocomb's battery, The Washington Artillery, moved forward (probably from reserve) to a position about 800 yards distant shortly after Loomis departed. Up until that time, he maintains that his battery had received little damage, and that had come primarily from his front - probably from Lumsden's 12-pounders and Stanford's three-inch rifles. About 1430, Simonson faced a new threat - Jones' brigade, with support from Lumsden's guns, entered the fray from the northeast. Simonson's fire was drawn from Donelson's and Stewart's attack to that of Jones' brigade. At about 1500, fire from Slocomb's smoothbores and 3.3 inch rifles, Lumsden's guns, and small arms fire from Jones' infantry began to tell, and Simonson was ordered to fall back about 300 yards toward the Russell House where his canister would have greater effect (O.R., 1886; Noe, 2001).

About 1530, Brown's brigade of Anderson's Division advanced along the same route as Jones had done with Captain Joseph Palmer's battery in support (Noe, 2001) against the Union brigades of Leonard Harris and Lytle (Figure 9). The battery, consisting of two six-pounders and two 12-pounders (Table 1), did not follow the same route as the infantry, and crossed Doctor's Creek 300-400 yards downstream from where it is crossed by the Mackville Road (Figure 2). Palmer was only able to position one section of his battery, and intense small arms fire from the 10th Wisconsin and the 10th Ohio Volunteers, who were supporting Simonson, soon forced him to withdraw. Brown's men replenished their ammunition and, without artillery support, continued their advance against Leonard Harris, who in turn, was unable to replenish his, and was thus forced back.

Figure 9: A. Digital elevation model showing the batteries involved in the southern sector of the battlefield.

Figure 9: B. Confederate fields of fire: Viewshed analysis of Semple's, Darden's, and Slocumb's positions. Mapped values indicate the number of batteries from which each location could be seen. These guns were well placed to fire at other guns; and also covered the advances of Jones, Brown and Johnson.

At about the same time Brown was advancing, Johnson's brigade was moving toward the Union lines and the ridge occupied by Simonson's battery. His advance was toward his left toward the intersection of Doctor's Creek and the Mackville road in order to avoid their fire (Figure 9). The route taken was protected by a small cliff on the west side of Doctor's Creek; this cliff further protected them from the enfilading Union batteries (Simonson's and one other) firing solid shot and spherical case (Figure 10; O.R., 1886). The three regiments were suddenly hit by canister from their left - Slocomb's gunners, located about on a ridge spur about 250-300 yards north of the Mackville Road, thinking Johnson's men were the enemy, were firing upon them (Noe, 2001). This was one of several friendly fire incidents that occurred in this part of the battlefield.

Figure 10: The cliff along Doctor's Creek north of the Mackville Road that protected the advance of Johnson's brigade from the fire of Simonson's battery.

Artillery fire against the Union brigades of Leonard Harris and Lytle soon intensified with Darden's four six- and 12-pounders, Semple's rifled section, and one section of Calvert's battery (Appendix 1) consisting of two 12-pounders joining Slocomb's four smoothbores and two rifles (Table 1; O.R., 1886; Noe, 2001). Darden had moved position twice, advancing both times. These weapons continued firing while moving forward until their ammunition was exhausted about dark and they were withdrawn at about 1930 (O.R., 1886). With their support, Johnson was able to advance to the top of the ridge previously occupied by Loomis' and Simonson's batteries and beyond the Russell House.

At some point during the late afternoon, Loomis' and Simonson's batteries were joined near the Russell House by Captain Hotchkiss and his two 12-pounders "on loan" to General McCook from Sheridan's Division (Noe, 2001; Appendix 1). Harris' battery had also been forced back behind the Russell House - about 1700 - by the advance of Donelson's brigade. Harris had in fact lost four of his six guns on the battlefield (O.R., 1886).

Cleburne's attack, supported by the massed artillery - the fourteen guns of Darden, Semple, Calvert and Slocomb (Noe, 2001) - from the vicinity of the Bottom House followed that of Johnson (Figure 11). As they moved up the hill, the brigade was hit by artillery fire from the rear - another example of friendly fire. Apparently, Johnson's men were dressed in blue trousers so Slocomb's battery assumed they were enemy infantry. As they neared the crest, they were again hit by artillery fire, but this time from Harris' battery that had fallen back to high ground near the Russell House. Loomis' battery was located nearby, about 150 yards behind the Russell House (O. R., 1886), but Loomis refused Rousseau's request to support Harris because he had been ordered to reserve his ammunition for close work by McCook - Rousseau convinced him that the enemy were close enough, and he opened fire at point-blank range (O.R., 1886; Noe, 2001). The additional artillery fire provided by Loomis had little affect on the Confederate advance.

Figure 11: Digital elevation model showing the batteries involved in the last phases of the Battle of Perryville.

Adams and General Sterling Wood continued the Confederate advance also supported by the massed artillery. Their goal was the junction of the Benton and Mackville roads, the Dixville Crossroads (Figure 2). As firing commenced, Captain Charles Barnett's and Captain Henry Hescock's batteries from Sheridan's division (Appendix 1) with their six 12-pounders and six rifles, four of which were Parrotts (Table 1), initiated intense enfilading fire on Adams's exposed left flank (Figure 11). Reinforcements from the Union Second Corps finally arrived and Colonel Michael Gooding's brigade, with Captain Oscar Pinney's six guns (Figure 11; Table 1), was also soon in place near the Dixville Crossroads (O.R, 1886). Space was limited, however, and Pinney was only able to position five of his six guns (Noe, 2001). Before long, Wood was forced back, but his place was taken by Liddell's brigade, that had been waiting in reserve. Liddell took the same route as Wood's retreating brigade, but when he reached the front line darkness was falling. In the confusion that resulted Liddell was unable to continue his advance toward Gooding's retreating brigade. Additional reinforcements from Gilbert's Corps were in the area, and Polk, who was on the field with Liddell, refused to allow him to continue.

Simonson was out of action, Harris and Loomis had abandoned their guns, and Pinney's battery was unable to fire because the guns had become too hot (Noe, 2001). Stone's and Bush's batteries had been put out of action long before, as had Parsons'. Yet the inferior Confederate artillery was still firing. "A few last shots echoed over the dark Chaplin Hills . . . followed by silence punctuated only by the screams and moans of the wounded. The Battle of Perryville was over." (Noe, 2001, 305)

CONCLUSIONS

The ground over which battle was fought, to a high degree, controlled how effective field artillery might be (as it does today), whether the weapons were smoothbore Napoleons or modern rifled Parrotts. Union batteries had good, sometimes excellent, positions, generally on the higher ground (e.g., Loomis' and Simonson's positions on the ridge above Doctor's Creek), but according to Noe (2001), even though the Confederate batteries had equipment inferior to that of the Union batteries in the Battle of Perryville (Table 1), the Confederate gunners generally outgunned the Union batteries throughout. The Confederate gunmen were veterans of Shiloh, whereas many of the Union gunners were relatively inexperienced. Only in two instances during the Battle of Perryville were the Confederate batteries forced to retreat - Carnes' battery from its initial position because his smoothbores didn't have the range required, and Palmer's, when overcome by small arms fire. Just as the terrain masked infantry advances, it also masked the batteries as they moved forward (e.g., Turner's position north of the Open Knob). In addition, the landscape at Perryville produced optical illusions that significantly affected the outcome of the battle. Because of an optical illusion the initial Confederate advance hit the center of the Union line, rather than flanking it as intended. And, with respect to the artillery batteries, optical illusions caused by the terrain made correct ranges difficult to determine (e.g., Lumsden's fire against Simonson's battery during the barrage).

The landscape in the north also provided cover and concealment for the attacking Confederate infantry, whereas the infantry in the south were exposed to friendly fire. Confederates in the south were also exposed to enemy artillery fire earlier in their advances than in the north - the terrain in the southern parts of the battlefield was more open than in the north. Furthermore, the topography in different parts of the battlefield was significant because of the distance between favorable artillery positions and the range of the weapons used. Batteries on the north end of the battlefield were much closer to each other, whereas the opposing batteries in the south were much further apart: Carnes' smoothbores, so ineffective in the south that his battery had to be withdrawn, performed admirably from his later position in the north. And Turner's success against Stone, Bush, and Parsons was only possible because the terrain was such that it allowed him to position his smoothbores within effective range.

REFERENCES

Connelly, T.L. 1967. Army of the Heartland, The Army of Tennessee 1861-1862. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 305 p.

Cressman, E.R. 1974. Geologic map of the Perryville quadrangle, mercer and Boyle Counties, Kentucky. U.S. Geological Survey Geologic Quadrangle GQ-11-85, 1 sheet, 1:24,000.

Hafendorfer, K.A. 1991. Perryville: Battle for Kentucky (2nd edition). Louisville: K.H. Press, 515 p.

Hazlett, James C., Olmstead, Edwin, and Parks, M. Hume. 1988, Field Artillery Weapons of the Civil War (2nd edition). Newark: University of Delaware Press, 322 p.

Katcher, Philip. 2001. American Civil War Artillery 1861-65 (1) Field Artillery. Oxford: Osprey Publishing Ltd., 48 p.

McDonough, James Lee.1994. War In Kentucky From Shiloh to Perryville. Knoxville: The University of Tennessee Press, 386 p.

Noe, K.W. 2001. Perryville, This Grand Havoc of Battle. Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press, 493 p.

Ripley, Warren. 1970. Artillery and Ammunition of the Civil War. New York: Promontory Press, 384 p.

War of the Rebellion Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies (O.R.). 1886. Series I, Volume 16, Part I, Reports, 1242 p.

Website: http://www.battleofperryville.com

BIOGRAPHIES

Dr. Ehlen is a geologist with additional degrees in German, history, and geography. She has been employed by the U.S. Army Engineer Research and Development Center in Alexandria, VA since 1971. Her areas of interest include fractures in granite (field study, 3-D modelling), weathering (primarily of granites), terrain analysis, and military geology, geography, and history. She is a Fellow of the Geological Society of America, currently chair of the Engineering Geology Division, and a Fellow of the Geological Society of London. She is also an active member of the Geological Society of Washington and the American Rock Mechanics Association. She belongs to the British Geomorphological Research Society, the Ussher Society, the Association of Engineering Geologists, the International Society for Rock Mechanics, the International Association of Engineering Geologists, and Sigma Xi. Dr. Ehlen resides in Fredericksburg, VA.

Dr. Abrahart is a computational geographer. He has a first degree in 'Geography' and higher degrees in 'Information Technology for Management', 'Geographical Information Systems', and 'Neural Network Hydrological Modelling'. He has been a lecturer in geographical information science at the University of Nottingham, United Kingdom, since 2000; previous lectureships were held at the University of Greenwich (United Kingdom) and University College Cork (Republic of Ireland). His main research interests are focused on the identification and appropriate utilization of modern computation-based technologies for spatial analysis, environmental modelling and in-silica geographical exploration. He is a Fellow of the Royal Geographical Society and a member of the Quantitative Methods Research Group and Geographical Information Science Research Group. He is also belongs to the Association for Geographic Information and is a co-founder of the GeoComputation Conference Series. Dr. Abrahart resides in Nottingham, East Midlands, UK.

William M. Andrews Jr. is a geologist at the Kentucky Geological Survey in Lexington, Kentucky. He holds B.S. and M.S. degrees in Geological Sciences from the University of Kentucky, and is currently pursuing a Ph.D. in fluvial landscape evolution. His research interests include landscape evolution, earth-surface processes, archaeological geology, and studies of human-landscape interaction such as the impacts of geology on historical events. He is a member of the Kentucky Society of Professional Geologists, and the Geological Society of America, and currently resides in Georgetown, Kentucky.

Table 1. The batteries and their guns (adapted from Noe, 2001).

	Smoothbores		Rifles
	Six-pounders	12-pounders	3-inch	3.3-inch	3.8-inch	Parrotts
Confederate
Carnes’ Battery	4
Stanford’s Battery			3
Turner’s Battery	2	2
Palmer’s Battery	2	2
Slocomb’s Battery	2	2		2
Barrett’s Battery	2	2
Lumsden’s Battery		4
Swett’s Battery	6	2
Key’s Section		2
Darden’s Battery	2	2
Semple’s Battery		4			2
Total	20	22	3	2	2	0
Union
Simonson’s Battery	2	2			2
Loomis’ Battery						6
Bush’s Battery	2	2			3
Stone’s Battery	2				2	2
Parsons’ Battery		7				1
Harris’ Battery		4	3
Pinney’s Battery		4				2
Hotchkiss’ Battery		2
Barnett’s Battery		2			2	2
Hescock’s Battery		4				2
Total	6	27	3	0	9	15

Appendix I: Abbreviated Order of Battle, October 8, 1862 (adapted from Noe, 2001)

Confederate Army of Mississippi, General Braxton Bragg
	Right Wing, Major General Leonidas Polk
		Cheatham’s Division, Major General Benjamin Franklin Cheatham
			Donelson’s Brigade, Brigadier Daniel S. Donelson
				Captain William W. Carnes’ Tennessee Battery
			Stewart’s Brigade, Brigadier General Alexander P. Stewart
				Captain T.J. Stanford’s Mississippi Battery
			Maney’s Brigade, Brigadier General George Maney
				Captain Melanchon Smith’s Mississippi Battery, Lieutenant William B. Turner commanding
			Smith’s Brigade, Brigadier General Preston Smith
			Wharton’s Cavalry Brigade, Colonel John A. Wharton
	Left Wing, Major General William J. Hardee
		Anderson’s Division, Brigadier General J. Patton Anderson
			Brown’s Brigade, Brigadier General John C. Brown
				Captain Joseph E. Palmer’s Battery A, 14th Battalion, Georgia Light Artillery
			Adam’s Brigade, Brigadier Daniel W. Adams
				Captain Cuthbert H. Slocomb’s 5th Company, Washington Artillery
			Powell’s Brigade, Colonel Samuel Powell
				Captain Overton W. Barrett’s Missouri Battery
			Jones’s Brigade, Colonel Thomas M. Jones
				Captain Charles L. Lumsden’s Battery F, 2nd Alabama Light Artillery
		Buckner’s Division, Major General Simon Bolivar Buckner
			Liddell’s Brigade, Brigadier General St. John Liddell
				Captain Charles Swett’s Mississippi Battery, Lieutenant Tom Havern commanding
			Cleburne’s Brigade, Brigadier General Patrick R. Cleburne
				Lieutenant Thomas Key’s Section, Calvert’s Arkansas Battery
			Johnson’s Brigade, Brigadier General Bushrod R. Johnson
				Captain Putnam Darden’s Mississippi Battery
			Wood’s Brigade, Brigadier General Sterling A.M. Wood
				Captain Henry C. Semple’s Alabama Battery
			Wheeler’s Cavalry Brigade, Colonel Joseph Wheeler
Union Army of Ohio, Major General Don Carlos Buell commanding, Major General George H. Thomas second in command
	First Corps, Major General Alexander McDowell McD. McCook
		3rd Division, Brigadier General Lovell H. Rousseau
			9th Brigade, Colonel Leonard A. Harris
				5th Battery, Indiana Light Artillery Captain Peter Simonson,
			17th Brigade, Colonel William H. Lytle
				1st Battery, Michigan Light Artillery, Captain Cyrus O. Loomis
			28th Brigade, Colonel John C. Starkweather
				4th Battery, Indiana Light Artillery, Captain Asahel K. Bush
				Battery A, Kentucky Light Artillery, Captain David C. Stone
		10th Division, Brigadier General James S. Jackson
			33rd Brigade, Brigadier General William Terrill
				Lieutenant Charles C. Parsons’ (Improvised) Battery
			34th Brigade, Colonel George Webster
				19th Battery, Indiana Light Artillery, Captain Samuel J. Harris
	Second Corps, Major General Thomas L. Crittenden
	Third Corps, Brigadier General (Acting Major General) Charles C. Gilbert
		1st Division, Brigadier General Albin Schoepf
		9th Division, Brigadier General Robert D. Mitchell
			13th Brigade, Colonel Michael Gooding
				5th Battery, Wisconsin Light Artillery, Captain Oscar F. Pinney
			31st Brigade, Colonel William P. Carlin
			32nd Brigade, Colonel William W. Caldwell
		11th Division, Brigadier General Philip H. Sheridan
			35th Brigade, Lieutenant Colonel Bernard Laiboldt
			36th Brigade, Colonel Daniel McCook
			37th Brigade, Colonel Nicholas Greusel
			3rd Calvary Brigade, Captain (Acting Brigadier) Ebenezer Gay
				2nd Battery, Minnesota Light Artillery (1 section), Captain William A. Hotchkiss
			Battery I, 2nd Illinois Light Artillery, Captain Charles M. Barnett
			Battery G., 1st Missouri Light Artillery, Captain Henry Hescock